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I. INTRODUCTION

A

t the end of Book IX of Plato’s Republic, Socrates
seems to have answered the text’s central questions,
having shown what the just life is and why it is better
and happier than the unjust life. Thus it is somewhat
unclear why the dialogue should then turn to a discussion of the
harmful effects of poetry in Book X. This apparent discontinuity
in the dialogue has led some scholars to dismiss Book X as a
tacked-on addendum with little relevance to the main focus of
the text.1 I, however, find no reason why we should be forced to
accept such interpretations. That Book X is difficult to interpret
is certain; that we should thus reject it as gratuitous is hardly reasonable. As Eric Havelock writes, “[a]n author possessing
Plato’s skill in composition is not likely to blunt the edge of what
he is saying by allowing his thoughts to stray away from it at the
end.”2 Thus the challenge for anyone writing on Book X is to articulate just how Plato’s thoughts accord with the rest of the text
in this book. The goal of this paper is to do just that: to present
an interpretation of Book X that incorporates it as a vital part of
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the complete text, rather than viewing it as an unnecessary addition to a nine-book work.
The typical way scholars go about situating Book X in the
context of the rest of the Republic is to relate it back to passages
from Books II and III, where Socrates first discusses the role and
censorship of the poets. The outcomes of such comparisons are
diverse. Some view Book X as completing ideas anticipated in
Book III; others consider the two books to be saying essentially
the same thing; still others see the two arguments as impossible
to reconcile with one another. I will not offer my opinion as to
which of these assessments is correct, for my solution is to avoid
this comparison entirely and rather to relate Book X to the central
focus of the Republic, the defense of justice.
To be sure, the argument against poetry in Book X does
not add to the defense of justice in the strictest sense; it does not
tell us more about what justice is (other than that the just life is
one free of most poetry) or why the just life is better and happier.
I will argue that what it does instead is to comment on the Republic’s defense of justice itself, showing us why we should believe
that defense and how we should react to it. To some, this interpretation may still seem to present Book X as playing an auxiliary role with respect to the rest of the text. This reasoning only
holds, however, insofar as one takes Plato to be concerned in the
Republic solely with presenting his account of the truth about justice and human virtue. I do not support this reading. The arguments in Book X show that Plato’s ambitions extend beyond
mere explication. He is also concerned about how his account
will be received, and Book X is his attempt to ensure that it is
both accepted and followed. Thus we cannot neglect its arguments as irrelevant; indeed, we have reason to give them extra
attention, as they are about how we are to respond to the text.
That is what this paper aims to accomplish: to show how an argument about poetry is really an argument about us.
II. THE METAPHYSICAL CHARGE AGAINST POETRY
The first part of the argument against poetry, the metaphysical
charge, challenges the popular conception of the poets by reveal-
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ing the true nature of popular poetry. To this end, Socrates argues that such works of poetry are in fact imitations, and in particular, that they are imitative in their portrayal of human excellence, or virtue. This point is significant because popular opinion
holds that works of poetry present the truth in this regard,
whereas Socrates wants to show that their presentations fall far
from the truth. What we have yet to see, however, is how these
qualities of popular poetry are a direct result of its being imitative. That is, what is it about being an imitation that makes the
presentation of human excellence in these works not only so far
from the truth but also convincing to the majority of people?
To answer these questions we must get a better grasp of
the concept of imitation as Socrates defines it. His own explanation of the word’s meaning relies on a three-tiered taxonomy of
being: first, a thing as it truly is; second, something which is like
the first thing, but is not it; and third, something which gives the
appearance of the second thing. For ease of reference, I will call
the first kind of thing the reality, the second its likeness (eikōn3),
and the third an appearance (phantasma/eidōlon4); imitations fall
into this third group of appearances.
This explanation, however, just displaces our problem.
We can now say that popular poetry presents merely the appearance of a likeness of genuine human excellence, but this does not
show any better the connection between being an imitation, being far from the truth, and being convincing. Comparison with
another case of imitation will help elucidate this point at this
stage. Socrates himself draws an analogy with painting for just
this purpose in Book X, but I want to avoid this comparison, as it
fails to exemplify those imitative qualities we are most interested
in.5 What we need to look at is a form of imitation that is clearly
both far from the truth of what it imitates and convincing to its
audience, and for this purpose I find good reason to look somewhere new, to a passage not often considered in discussions of
Book X: the allegory of the cave.6
First, consider Socrates’ taxonomy of being as applied to
the different things in the allegory. The first kind of being, or
reality, corresponds to the world above the cave, where things
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themselves exist in nature. The likenesses of this reality are the
artifacts carried in front of the fire—“statues of people and other
animals, made out of stone, wood, and everything else.”7 These
things are like the things above the cave but are decidedly not
the same; they exist as representations of the things that truly
are. The appearances of these likenesses are, of course, their
shadows, the images that go flittering by in front of the eyes of
the prisoners. Thus the shadows in the cave are imitations—in
Book X’s sense of the word—of the actual things in the world
above.8
To understand what makes the shadows far from the
truth, we must consider how they are produced. We have seen
that the shadows are classified as being appearances of statues,
but we should not think of them as faithful reproductions of their
likenesses; in fact, appearances by their very nature are distorted
representations. As Socrates notes, if one walks around a bed
and views it from different angles, the bed will appear different
each time without ever being different itself—it is always the
same bed.9 Likewise, a statue will appear different as it is rotated
and tilted, while always remaining one and the same statue.
And if the statue were held in front of the light of a fire, one
could easily produce many different shadows by simply turning
and moving the statue around, as the shadow of a cylinder can
look like a circle from one angle and a rectangle from another. A
shadow is precisely this kind of appearance, only capturing how
its statue variously appears and not how it actually is. It presents a two-dimensional silhouette of its statue, devoid of any
color or texture; thus a shadow can hardly be said to be like its
statue at all. In this way, an appearance is hardly like its likeness, and like all forms of imitation, “touches only a small part of
each thing.”10 Imitations capture things only as they appear, not
as they are, and this is why imitations are so far from the truth.
The next aspect to look at is what makes the shadows
convincing to their audience, and for this purpose we must consider how they are perceived by the prisoners inside the cave.
That the prisoners find the shadows convincing is clear: they
“believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows,”11 to
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the extent that they cannot even recognize reality for what it
truly is. Unless unchained, they never catch a glimpse of the
world behind them; they wholeheartedly believe the world of
shadows they see before them to be all there is. Their belief is
not due, however, to the shadows’ fidelity to reality; indeed, it
cannot be, as the shadows are in fact far from the truth, as shown
above. Rather, their belief is caused by their own ignorance of
the world outside the cave and of what reality truly is. For their
entire lives, the prisoners have seen nothing other than the shadows; thus reality to them is nothing other than the shadows. In
their ignorance, they cannot see the shadows as we do. They
would never even think of them as being shadows, as they do not
possess our distinction between shadows and reality. From their
point of view, the shadows are the reality, and it is of great importance to keep their perspective in mind. In this way, imitations appear to be the truth to those who are ignorant, and this is
why imitations are so convincing to their audience—not because
they are intrinsically convincing, but because their audience has
never encountered the truth.
We are now ready to return to the case of popular poetry
and see just how its imitations work. To begin, consider the taxonomy of being as applied to the case of poetry and human excellence. The first kind of thing, or the reality, would be the virtue itself as its Form: Justice, Courage, Temperance, what have
you. This virtue’s likeness would be a person exhibiting excellent behavior, an instance of the virtue but not the virtue itself.
The third kind of thing would be the appearance of such a character in both senses of the word: a distorted portrayal of what
excellent behavior is truly like that is nevertheless convincing to
its audience.12 Socrates contends that popular poetry presents
just such an appearance.
The first criticism of popular poetry is that it is far from
the truth of what it imitates. In other words, popular works of
poetry only capture a small part of excellent behavior, just as a
shadow only captures the outline of its statue from one angle.
Though both forms of imitation resemble their corresponding
likenesses in a certain respect, they fail to resemble them in
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countless others. Just as a shadow distorts its statue’s color, texture, and three-dimensionality, poetic works distort the true nature of excellent behavior (as it is presented in the Republic): rational thought and deliberation.13 The heroes of popular poetry,
rather, are full of inner conflict, being pulled in various directions by their myriad desires. They overreact and become emotional over their tragic misfortunes. They are “excitable and multicolored,”14 exaggerated and bombastic, exactly the sort of personalities we would call “dramatic” or “theatrical.” These sorts
of portrayals, fundamental to all the kinds of poetry that concern
Socrates, do not at all capture what excellent behavior is truly
like.
Yet these sorts of appearances are no less convincing to
the members of their audience, who are ignorant of the truth
about excellent human behavior. It is excitable and exaggerated
heroes that we expect and demand from our poetry. They are
the types of characters we find most believable; they are the characters which to us appear to be excellent.15 Socrates comments
that:
A rational and quiet character, which always remains pretty well the same, is neither easy to imitate nor easy to understand when imitated, especially not by a crowd consisting of all sorts of people gathered together at a theater festival, for the
experience being imitated is alien to them.16
Socrates is here saying that the genuinely excellent character is
out of place in the world of popular poetry. His or her appearance on stage would be odd and disorienting, but most of all unsatisfying. The piece would be looked upon as a poor and
“unrealistic” work of art, when in fact it is closer to reality than
anything normally presented by the poets. A similar phenomenon occurs inside the cave: if a prisoner were freed and compelled to look at the statues behind him, “he’d believe that the
things he saw earlier [the shadows] were truer than the ones he
was seeing now.”17 Given the ignorance of the common people,
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it is no surprise that they mistake the distorted portrayals of excellent behavior for the truth—they simply do not know any better. They believe in only what they are accustomed to seeing and
thus are unreceptive to seeing anything different. Popular opinion only attributes so much wisdom to the poets because of the
public’s own ignorance of what the truth is actually like.
This is the push behind the metaphysical charge against
poetry. In arguing that popular works of poetry are in fact imitations, Socrates asserts the essential triviality of popular poetry,
which, in the context of the discussion, is no trivial point. He is
arguing against the popular opinion that poets know all about
human virtue and that popular works of poetry give us insight
into the truth. By revealing the actual triviality of popular poetry, Socrates destroys this very belief. He shows that the things
most people consider to be the truth are actually mere appearances that are far removed from what the truth really is. Or, in
more familiar terms, the point is that up to now we have only
been looking at shadows in the cave, and like the prisoners there,
we are convinced of the truth of what we are seeing. The discussion of poetry in Book X is what Jonathan Lear would refer to as
an “aha!-experience,” in which we say to ourselves, “So that’s
what the allegory of the cave is really about!”18 It takes the allegory of the cave and makes it real, showing us the hollowness in
the common conception of human excellence.
This point is essential to the argument of the Republic and
begins to explain the placement of Book X in the text. The defense of justice presented in the first nine books is framed in contrast with the popular opinions of the time. Thus after the true
nature of justice has been explained and illustrated—that is, after
Book IX—important questions still remain, questions any contemporary of Plato would have been likely to ask: Why should
we doubt what we have always taken to be the truth? Why
should we abandon what we, along with our fellow citizens,
have believed since childhood in favor of the radical opinions of
some philosopher? The metaphysical charge, especially when
read alongside the allegory of the cave, directly addresses these
questions. It shows that appearances can be deceiving, that what
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we have always assumed to be the truth can in fact be far from it.
By identifying popular works of poetry as imitations of human
excellence, the argument shows that the truth of the matter need
not look anything like the popular “wisdom” we glean from the
poets. Rather, the truth about human excellence can be something that seems foreign and even implausible—something, perhaps, like the defense of justice that fills the pages before Book X.
In this way, the metaphysical charge is indispensable to the overall argument of the text, showing why we should believe a philosophical account that runs counter to everything we have hitherto believed—that is, why we should believe the argument of
the Republic.
III. THE ETHICAL CHARGE AGAINST POETRY
Book X’s criticism does not end with the metaphysical charge. In
addition, it presents an ethical charge against popular poetry,
showing that it, by its very nature, harms the souls of its listeners. In this way, the argument against poetry continues the discussion begun in Books VIII and IX of the various ways in which
the soul can be corrupted.19 Popular poetry is shown in Book X
to draw us away from virtuous behavior, instead encouraging us
to act in shameful ways. Moreover, the corrupting influence of
poetry is not limited to those who are ignorant of what excellent
behavior is truly like; as we will see, it is just as capable of harming those who know better.
First, however, we must understand what it is about
popular poetry that makes it so ethically harmful to begin with.
We know from the metaphysical charge that poetry is imitative
in its portrayal of excellent human behavior. To clarify just how
imitative poetry works its ethical harm on its audience, Socrates
considers the specific example of how it portrays human behavior in matters of misfortune. First he examines how we ourselves
react to misfortune and recognizes that in such instances there
are most often “two opposite inclinations in a person,”20 one that
tells her to control her grief and another that tells her to give in to
it. The former is the voice of the rational part of her soul and on
the side of “reason and law;”21 the latter is the voice of her non-
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rational part. The urgings of the rational part point towards “the
best way to deal with misfortune,”22 telling her to keep quiet and
not get excited or overly emotional, so as to be able to deliberate
over the best way to cope with the situation. The non-rational
part, on the other hand, exhorts her to lament over her sorrows,
until she is “weeping and wailing” like a child.23
As we saw above, the characters of imitative poetry are
excited and exaggerated personalities that weep and wail over
their misfortunes—that is, characters that act on the urgings of
the non-rational part of the soul. The real danger of popular poetry, however, comes from what happens when we watch these
kinds of characters. Socrates explains:
When even the best of us hear Homer or some
other tragedian imitating one of the heroes sorrowing and making a long lamenting speech or
singing and beating his breast, you know that we
enjoy it, give ourselves up to following it, sympathize with the hero, take his sufferings seriously,
and praise as a good poet the one who affects us
most in this way.24
What we appreciate and enjoy most about works of poetry is
their ability to move us emotionally, to bring us into their dramatic world and make us feel their characters’ sorrows. In other
words, watching characters weep and wail on stage makes us
weep and wail ourselves, provided the poet is a good one. By
presenting characters that act on the urgings of their non-rational
part, imitative poetry makes us act on the urgings of our nonrational part. We weep, we wail, we become emotional. Imitative
poetry encourages us to disregard the bidding of our rational
part and rather to act as our non-rational part wants us to act.
Thus the imitative poet “arouses, nourishes, and strengthens this
part of the soul and so destroys the rational one.”25 Imitative poetry rewards the lesser part and neglects the better part of us,
and in this way it “puts a bad constitution in the soul of each individual.”26 This is why popular poetry is ethically harmful.
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It may be thought, however, that the ethical danger of
popular poetry can be removed if we know the truth about human excellence. In other words, if one recognizes that the characters in poetry are not acting in the truly best ways, one will
have no reason to applaud, admire, or sympathize with them,
and thus one will avoid any possible ethical harm. Socrates even
seems to suggest something of the sort at the beginning of Book
X, when he says that imitative poetry is “likely to distort the
thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of
what it is really like, as a drug [pharmakon] to counteract it.”27
However, it is a mistake to assume that this pharmakon is simply
the account presented in the metaphysical charge, namely that
poetry is imitative in its portrayal of human excellence. This is
certainly part of the pharmakon, but it is not all there is to it. Socrates says later that imitative poetry is “able to corrupt even decent people,”28 which I take to mean that poetry is capable of
harming even those who know better, those who know the truth
about human excellence. This means, of course, that there is another part of poetry’s nature that even decent people fail to recognize and which, if not recognized, is capable of doing harm to
one’s soul. Thus we must consider how these people, who know
that poetry does not present the truth, still manage to be corrupted by poetry’s influence.
To begin, Socrates notes that the sort of overemotional
behavior seen in popular poetry is not at all what we would
deem proper in our own lives.29 In our own behavior, the actions
we value and praise are nothing like the actions we applaud in
poetry. When we ourselves experience misfortune, we know we
should control our emotions, not give in to them. In other
words, in our own actions we recognize and strive towards
genuine human excellence, while in our reactions to poetry we
want to see the kinds of actions that are far from what is best and
are in fact what is worst. Socrates then raises the obvious question:
Then are we right to praise [imitative poetry]? Is it
right to look at someone behaving in a way that
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we would consider unworthy and shameful and
to enjoy and praise it rather than being disgusted
by it?30

His answer to this question is an emphatic “no.”
Socrates is here taking issue with an experience common
to us all: enjoying things we know are not respectable. When it is
time for dessert, we enjoy most the cake that is supremely decadent, even though we know it is not what is best for the body.
The situation is the same in the case of imitative poetry: in our
private misfortunes, we pride ourselves on our ability to control
the non-rational part of our souls. Yet this is “the very part that
receives satisfaction and enjoyment from poets,”31 and we admire and enjoy the poetic works that satisfy us most in this way.
From this example, it may seem that the temptation of
poetry lies in its strong appeal to our non-rational desires, and
without a doubt, this is part of the explanation: our emotional
desires are naturally drawn towards the poet’s dramatic portrayals. But this is not the crux of the argument. The point is that
when we listen to poetry, our rational part is willing and even
thinks it beneficial to indulge the desires of the non-rational part.
Thus it is not that we can’t resist the allure of poetry—rather, it is
that we don’t.
Socrates contends that we act in this way out of ignorance. Not having been “adequately educated by either reason
or habit,”32 the rational part thinks that “there is no shame involved for it in praising and pitying another man who, in spite of
his claim to goodness, grieves excessively.”33 The rational part
makes the mistake of relaxing its guard when watching someone
else’s actions, whereas it would not relax itself in the case of its
own. This, however, is a fatal mistake, for whether one is responding to one’s own actions or to another’s, one is always responding with one and the same soul—one’s own. The soul that
we allow to take pleasure in the shameful actions of others is the
same soul that will be in control in our own actions. The nonrational part, “if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others, won’t easily be held in check when we ourselves
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suffer.”34 By allowing the non-rational part to enjoy itself when
listening to poetry, we are relinquishing the control the rational
part has over our soul and our actions, which is an effect that
will last even after the performance is finished.
This is why imitative poetry can corrupt even those who
know better than to act like the characters in tragedies or epics in
their own lives. Even though these people know that the behavior of such characters is shameful, they do not recognize that the
enjoyment of such behavior is also shameful; indeed, they deny
this fact. They view poetry as a harmless diversion, and a pleasurable one at that; this is what makes poetry so tempting to
them. They believe that poetry affords them the opportunity to
gratify their non-rational desires without the risk of real harm,
when in truth they are doing themselves the greatest harm—
corrupting the state of their very souls.
Poetry may bring us into its fictional world of actors, but
we as audience members are never pretending. The way our
souls react to poetry is as real and as genuine as actual experience. If it is shameful to weep over one’s misfortunes in one’s
own life, it is just as shameful and, moreover, harmful to weep
over a character’s misfortunes in a work of poetry. This is the
fact that even decent people fail to recognize, and this is why
imitative poetry can corrupt even them. Anyone who recognizes
this final element of the ethical charge will not be willing to indulge in the shameful enjoyment of poetry any more than he
would be willing to behave in such shameful ways in his own
life. In other words, only now, at the end of the ethical charge,
do we arrive at the aforementioned pharmakon—the knowledge
of what imitative poetry in all its aspects is really like and the
knowledge that ultimately prevents such poetry from doing us
harm.35
We can now see the full extent of the ethical charge
against poetry. First, we are shown that poetry, by drawing us
into its dramatic world, strengthens the lesser part in us and
thereby does harm to our souls. Second, we are shown why even
the best of us fail to avoid this danger by failing to recognize the
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very real harm the enjoyment of poetry brings. The conclusion is
that no good can come from popular poetry, and thus the virtuous life is one devoid of popular poetry.
This point should not be lost on the reader of the Republic,
for the ethical charge against poetry is just as important as the
metaphysical charge to the overall argument of the text. It shows
us that knowing the truth about human excellence alone will not
put us in a much better position. In addition, we must actively
live out this truth in our every action, and this message is a particularly relevant one at this stage in the dialogue. The first nine
books of the Republic present the reader with the truth about justice and human virtue; Book X tells the reader that just being
aware of this truth is not enough. That is, we should not think
ourselves better for just having read the Republic. What truly
makes us better is what we do after we finish reading, namely,
living our lives according to truth and virtue. If we do not make
such a change in our actions, the awareness we have of the truth
gets us nowhere. Thus the effect of the ethical charge is a galvanizing one. It is Plato’s attempt to spur his readers into
(virtuous) action and a warning against thinking oneself able to
act shamefully without consequence. It speaks to the need and
urgency of virtuous behavior in all our actions, thus showing
why we should adhere to the Republic’s account of justice and
human virtue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance and relevance of Book X can now be seen in all
its manifestations. Its arguments reflect back on the Republic’s
central discussion of justice, showing why we should both accept
and follow its account of virtue. In this way, Book X, ostensibly
an argument about poetry, is in fact an argument about us and
how we are to react to the text. Yet it may be suggested that
Book X, strictly speaking, is not an argument for us but an argument for them, the original readers of the Republic. Certainly, it
cannot be denied that the criticisms in Book X were a result of the
historical moment in which Plato was writing. Poetry today is
nothing like it was in that time, nor is there any one thing in our
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own society with the ubiquity and influence of Ancient Greek
poetry. This does not mean, however, that the Republic is limited
by its historical and cultural context. More broadly speaking,
Book X argues against the forces that prevent us from accepting
and following the Republic’s account of justice and human virtue,
and these forces are just as much present in our contemporary
society. The Republic’s ideas of what the just life is and why it is
best still sound foreign to even our modern ears, and we are certainly a long way from abiding by such principles in our own
lives. Book X challenges us to ask ourselves just why that is.
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NOTES

Most notably Annas, who describes Book X as “gratuitous and
clumsy,” “full of oddities,” “an excrescence,” “[the Republic’s]
lame and messy ending,” and “added to a work essentially complete already” (Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, 335,
353).
2 Havelock, Preface to Plato, 3.
3 cf. Plato, Republic, 401b.
4 cf. Ibid., 598b.
5 Socrates, however, would disagree. He argues that painting is
not only far from the truth in its imitative portrayal of (visual)
reality but also convincing to some: “If [the artist] is a good
painter and displays his painting of a carpenter at a distance, he
can deceive children and foolish people into thinking that it is
truly a carpenter” (Plato, Republic, 598c). This claim makes precisely the point I am looking for (that imitations are convincing
to those who are ignorant of the truth), but I find its example too
implausible and unconvincing to drive the point home.
6 As Harte notes, the question that marks the beginning of Book
X’s argument (“Could you tell me what imitation in general is?”
595c) suggests “the initiation of a Socratic inquiry into the nature
of mimesis [imitation]” (Harte, “Republic X and the Role of the
Audience in Art,” 3). We can then read the metaphysical charge
as explicating the essence of imitation, which is common to all its
various kinds. Thus I find little cause for concern in considering
one instance of imitation in favor of another, especially when the
substitute better illustrates my point.
7 Plato, Republic, 514c.
8 Burnyeat also makes the connection between imitation and the
cave: “[The metaphysical status of imitations] matches exactly
the status of the shadows in the Cave: they derive from the puppets carried along the wall, which are themselves likenesses of
the real people, animals, and things outside the cave. The shadows are at third remove (Greeks count inclusively) from the real
things outside” (Burnyeat, “Culture and Value in Plato’s Repub1
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lic,” 243). But this is as far as he takes the analogy; I hope to fill
in some of the details in what follows.
9 Plato, Republic, 598a ff.
10 Ibid., 598b.
11 Ibid., 515c.
12 Moss makes the keen observation that there are two senses in
which ‘apparent’ can be used in English: “clearly visible or understood; obvious” and “seeming real or true, but not necessarily
so.” This distinction is also found in Greek: phainesthai with the
participle yields the former sense (“that a thing manifestly is so
and so”), phainesthai with the infinitive the latter (“that a thing
appears to be so and so”). Moss points out that Plato uses the
infinitive construction exclusively in the relevant passages of
Book X, suggesting that we should understand ‘appearance’ in
its latter, “ostensible” sense. (Cf. Moss, “What is Imitative Poetry
and Why is it Bad?” 426, n. 19. The lexical citations come from
the Oxford American Dictionary and Liddell & Scott, respectively.)
13 cf. Plato, Republic, 604c-d.
14 Ibid., 605a
15 Here I follow closely the interpretation presented in Moss,
“What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?” 432-434.
16 Plato, Republic, 604e.
17 Ibid., 515d.
18 For more on “aha!-experiences”, see Lear, “Allegory and Myth
in Plato’s Republic,” 37.
19 This reading is also endorsed by Nehamas, who describes
Book X as “a part of the long discussion of the perversions of the
soul and of the city that begins with Book 8” (Nehamas, “Plato
on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10,” 53).
20 Plato, Republic, 604b.
21 Ibid., 604a.
22 Ibid., 604d.
23 Ibid., 604c.
24 Ibid., 605c-d. Note the use of the verb ‘sympathize’ in this passage. The Greek verb is sumpaschein, or literally ‘to experience/
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suffer along with’. According to the LSJ, this is a relatively rare
word in the Greek corpus, and its earliest known usage is found
in Plato’s Charmides. There it is used in the sense of ‘to have the
same thing happen to one', as is evident from the passage in
which it appears: “…the sight of someone yawning opposite
causes people to be affected [sumpaschousin] in the same
way” (169c). The only other instance of sumpaschein in Plato is in
the passage from Book X quoted above, to which the LSJ (and
also our translator) attributes the slightly different sense of ‘to
have a fellow-feeling, sympathize, feel sympathy’. However,
given sumpaschein’s morphological roots and clear meaning in
the Charmides, along with Plato’s very possible coinage of the
word, ‘to sympathize’ seems like a mistranslation, likely influenced by the related though not equivalent verb sumpathein, ‘to
sympathize’. Rather, we should read Plato here as saying that
when we watch a poetic hero weep and wail over his misfortunes, the same thing happens to us—that is, we also weep and
wail over his misfortunes.
25 Plato, Republic, 605b.
26 Ibid., 605b.
27 Ibid., 595b.
28 Ibid., 605c, emphasis my own.
29 cf. Ibid., 605d-e.
30 Ibid., 605e.
31 Ibid., 605a.
32 Ibid., 606a.
33 Ibid., 606b.
34 Ibid., 606b.
35 For evidence that the conclusions of the ethical charge are indeed the pharmakon mentioned at the beginning of the chapter,
see Socrates’ comments at the end of the section: “We’ll repeat
the argument we have just now put forward like an incantation
so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that childish
passion for poetry which the majority of people have” (608a).
Both ‘pharmakon’ and ‘incantation’ have similar curative and
therapeutic undertones that suggest these two passages are to be
read together.
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